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INTRODUCTION 
Edvard Munch, painter of “The Scream,” famously said, 
“Sickness, insanity and death were the angels that 
surrounded my cradle, and they have followed me 
throughout my life.”1 Although Munch was referring to his 
difficult childhood and his turbulent adult life, the quote 
fairly depicts the experience of those with severe mental 
illness who find themselves enmeshed in the criminal justice 
 
† Associate Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals. This Article was 
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Psychiatry and the Law at the University of Rochester Medical Center in 
September 2018. I would like to thank Dr. Robert L. Weisman and Dr. J. Richard 
Ciccone from the University of Rochester for their assistance and feedback on 
that presentation. All views expressed herein are my own and not reflective of 
the positions or opinions of the Court or its members. 
†† Senior Principal Law Clerk to the Hon. Eugene M. Fahey. 
††† J.D. Candidate 2020, Cornell Law School; B.S. 2017, St. Thomas Aquinas 
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 1. Edvard Munch, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworld 
encyclopedia.org/entry/Edvard_Munch (last visited April 15, 2020). 
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system. Some of these individuals plead not guilty by reason 
of insanity.2 
During my time as an Associate Judge on New York’s 
Court of Appeals, I visited maximum security prisons 
throughout the state. Frequently, I would ask what 
percentage of inmates in the facility were being treated for 
mental health disorders. Invariably, the anecdotal figures I 
received was that approximately fifty percent of inmates are 
being treated for some form of mental health problem, and 
that approximately ten percent have a serious mental 
disorder. Thus far, I have visited thirteen of New York’s 
maximum-security prisons. 
Reality vs. Perception 
Charles Ewing—a professor at University at Buffalo 
Law School, prominent forensic psychologist, and expert on 
this subject—says that he tells his students, “you have to be 
crazy to plead insanity.”3 This is because the insanity defense 
is rarely used, and even more rarely successful. It may result 
in lifetime confinement in a secure psychiatric facility, even 
when it is successful.4 Studies indicate that nationally, fewer 
than one percent of criminal cases involve an insanity 
defense, and of those cases, the defense succeeds in fewer 
than a quarter of them.5 Nationally, when the insanity 
defense is disputed at trial, “only an estimated one-120th of 
[one] percent of contested felony cases” end in a successful 
 
 2. The average trial judge seldom sees an insanity case given the rarity of 
the defense. Trial judges more often deal with competency proceedings under 
Criminal Procedure Law article 730 in criminal cases. In civil cases, trial judges 
are likely to see proceedings for appointment of a guardian for those with 
incapacities under Mental Hygiene Law article 81, hospitalization of the 
mentally ill pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 9, or the civil commitment 
of sex offenders under Mental Hygiene Law article 10. Those proceedings are 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
 3. CHARLES PATRICK EWING, INSANITY: MURDER, MADNESS, AND THE LAW xv 
(2008). 
 4. See generally id. at xxii–xxiv. 
 5. Id. at xxii. 
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insanity defense.6 The vast majority of insanity acquittals 
result from a plea agreement, where the prosecution 
concedes that the defendant meets the requirements for the 
insanity defense,7 rather than after a trial where the defense 
is disputed. 
In the State of New York, of approximately five thousand 
murder cases between 2007 and 2016, just six ended with the 
defendant found not responsible by reason of mental disease 
or defect; the state does not track how often the defense is 
raised.8 Between 2013 and 2017, only eleven defendants out 
of 19,041 felony and misdemeanor trials conducted in the 
state were found not responsible by reason of mental disease 
or defect pursuant to Penal Law § 40.15, and 241 defendants 
entered an insanity plea out of 1,375,096 convictions during 
the same time period.9 As of June 30, 2018, 260 insanity 
acquittees were receiving treatment in secure confinement 
and another 452 insanity acquittees “were in the community 
subject to orders of conditions.”10 
Despite this evidence to the contrary, the public is 
persistent in its belief that insanity is a loophole that sane 
defendants frequently fake in order to escape punishment.11 
The public overestimates how often the insanity defense is 
 
 6. Mac McClelland, When “Not Guilty” Is a Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/magazine/when-not-guilty-is-a-
life-sentence.html. 
 7. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A 
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 188 (2d ed. 1997). 
 8. James C. McKinley Jr. & Jan Ransom, Nanny Faces Tough Insanity Test: 
Did She Know Killing Was Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/03/27/nyregion/nanny-murder-trial-insanity-defense.html; see 
also Russ Buettner, Mentally Ill, But Insanity Plea Is Long Shot, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/nyregion/mental-illness-is-no-gua 
rantee-insanity-defense-will-work-for-tarloff.html. 
 9. Christopher Liberati-Conant & Sheila E. Shea, ‘You Have to Be Crazy to 
Plead Insanity’: How an Acquittal Can Lead to Lifetime Confinement, 91 N.Y. 
STATE B. ASS’N J. 28, 30 (2019). 
 10. Id. at 30–31. 
 11. EWING, supra note 3, at xxii. 
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raised and how successful it is.12 In addition, although media 
reports often equate mental illness with violent behavior, 
individuals with mental illness are overall more likely to be 
victims of violence than perpetrators.13 
The Essential New York Statutes 
Penal Law § 40.15 provides New York’s definition of the 
insanity defense, which New York formally refers to as “lack 
of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or 
defect.” Penal Law § 40.15 states: 
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that 
when the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked 
criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect. Such 
lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of such 
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked 
substantial capacity to know or appreciate either: (1) The nature 
and consequences of such conduct; or (2) That such conduct was 
wrong.14 
Insanity is an affirmative defense in New York, which 
means that the defendant bears the burden of proving that 
he or she was insane at the time of the crime by a 
preponderance of the evidence.15 This essentially means that 
the evidence the defendant presents tending to establish that 
he or she was insane at the time of the crime must outweigh 
the evidence presented by the prosecution to the contrary.16 
 
 12. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 187–88; MICHAEL L. PERLIN & 
HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 14-3.2 (3d 
ed. 2017); Natalie Jacewicz, After Hinckley, States Tightened Use of The Insanity 
Plea, NPR (July 28, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/28/ 
486607183/after-hinckley-states-tightened-use-of-the-insanity-plea. 
 13. A.B.A. DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REV. PROJECT, SEVERE MENTAL 
ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY 17–18 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/con 
tent/dam/aba/images/crsj/DPDPRP/SevereMentalIllnessandtheDeathPenalty_W
hitePaper.pdf. 
 14. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 2019). 
 15. PENAL § 25.00(2). 
 16. Insanity (Lack of Criminal Responsibility By Reason of Mental Disease or 
Defect) Penal Law § 40.15, in N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, C.J.I.2D[NY] 
INSTRUCTIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY 2 (last updated Nov. 27, 2019), 
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It is a lower standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter “CPL”] § 250.10 
contains important procedural provisions relevant to the 
insanity defense. It provides that whenever the defense 
intends to present psychiatric evidence of a mental disease 
or defect in connection with any defense, not just the insanity 
defense, the defense must serve notice thirty days after entry 
of a not guilty plea to the indictment.17 The Court of Appeals 
recently held that this notice requirement applies when the 
defense wishes to introduce psychiatric evidence to 
demonstrate that a defendant could not fully understand or 
waive his Miranda rights.18 The trial court can permit late 
notice in the interest of justice for good cause shown before 
the close of evidence.19 CPL § 250.10 also contains provisions 
regarding the psychiatric examinations the defendant must 
submit to at the request of the prosecutor after such notice is 
provided.20 
Other relevant New York statutes include CPL § 220.15, 
which allows a defendant to enter a plea of not responsible 
by reason of mental disease or defect to the entire indictment 
so long as the court and the prosecutor consent.21 CPL 
§ 330.20 governs all post-verdict proceedings when a 
defendant is found not responsible by reason of mental 
disease or defect, including the confinement of the defendant 
in a psychiatric facility and the periodic review of the 
defendant’s mental health and appropriate confinement.22 
The Practice Insights by John Castellano following CPL 
§ 250.10 in GILBERT’S CRIMINAL PRACTICE ANNUAL, 2020 
contain useful observations about evaluating whether and 
 
https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/Defenses/CJI2d.Insanity.pdf. 
 17. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.10(1), (2) (McKinney 2019). 
 18. People v. Silburn, 98 N.E.3d 696, 702–03, 707 (N.Y. 2018). 
 19. CRIM. PROC. § 250.10(2). 
 20. § 250.10(3)–(5). 
 21. § 220.15. 
 22. § 330.20. 
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how to pursue a psychiatric defense, including the defense of 
insanity. They include discussion concerning the hiring of an 
expert to evaluate the viability of the defense, determining 
the cooperativeness of the defendant and the likelihood that 
the court will allow the defense, and considering the 
consequences of a successful defense, including the 
possibility of the defendant’s lengthy confinement in a 
psychiatric facility after a successful insanity defense.23 
Overview 
This Article explores the arc of development of the 
insanity defense in national history and in New York State. 
The Article begins in Part I with a national history. It 
discusses the various tests for insanity that have developed 
and the widespread impact that the Hinckley acquittal had 
on insanity law in the United States. Part II focuses on New 
York’s insanity defense. It discusses the history of the 
defense in New York, the battle of the experts that typically 
ensues, and what happens after a successful insanity 
defense. The Article also reviews some famous cases arising 
out of Western New York involving the insanity defense. 
Finally, Part III contains a brief overview of just a few of the 




 23. John M. Castellano, Practice Insights: Considering Psychiatric Defense, in 
GILBERT’S CRIM. PRAC. ANN., 2020, at CPL-389–390. 
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I. HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
A. Theoretical Framework 
The insanity defense “touches—philosophically, 
culturally, and psychologically—on our ultimate social 
values and beliefs [and] is rooted in moral principles of 
excuse that are accepted in both ordinary human interaction 
and criminal law.”24 Justification and excuse are two broad 
categories of defenses to criminal behavior. Justification 
contemplates the moral culpability of an act itself, whereas 
excuse contemplates personal culpability.25 Classic examples 
of justification in the law, like self-defense,26 deal with the 
circumstances surrounding an act, while excuses, like 
involuntary intoxication and duress,27 tend to deal with the 
actor’s state of being. 
Insanity provides an excuse, rather than a justification, 
for criminal behavior. When a defendant is found not guilty 
by reason of insanity, the fact-finder has concluded that the 
defendant should not be held criminally responsible for his 
or her behavior because the defendant cannot understand 
the nature or wrongfulness of the criminal conduct, or cannot 
conform his or her conduct to the law. In other words, the 
defendant has not intentionally chosen to commit a criminal 
act. As a society, we conclude that the defendant is not 
morally blameworthy because we should punish only those 
whose criminal behavior is the result of their own free will. 
Traditional goals of criminal punishment, such as 
retribution and deterrence, do not apply with equal force to 
a defendant who meets the criteria for the insanity defense. 
 
 24. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.1 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 25. George P. Fletcher, The Right and The Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 
954 (1985). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 954–55. 
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B. Early History 
The insanity defense predates both the professional 
studies of psychiatry and psychology,28 and can be traced 
back to ancient civilizations such as the Talmudic, Greeks, 
and Romans.29 Hebrew scriptures from the sixth century 
B.C. that discuss criminal offenses group children and the 
insane together, excusing both from fault.30 Similarly, under 
Rome’s sixth century Code of Justinian, the insane were not 
held responsible for their otherwise criminal acts.31 
Although the concept of insanity as a defense to criminal 
conduct is ancient, our modern understanding of the insanity 
defense is the product of centuries of judicial development 
within case law. Judges were influenced by the work of legal 
scholars such as Henry Bracton. Writing in the thirteenth 
century, Bracton—the author of THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF 
ENGLAND—observed that the insane should be excused from 
criminal punishment because, much like children, they are 
unable to form the intent necessary to commit a crime.32 
C. Development Under Common Law 
One of the earliest examples of the insanity defense in 
case law comes from England in the case Rex v. Arnold, 
decided in 1724.33 There the judge instructed the jury that 
for a defendant to be acquitted by reason of insanity he “must 
 
 28. EWING, supra note 3, at xxi. 
 29. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.1. 
 30. AAPL Practice Guideline for Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of 
Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S4 
(2014). 
 31. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.1. 
 32. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S4; Daniel P. Greenfield, 
Criminal Responsibility from a Clinical Perspective, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7, 10–
11 (2009). Henry Bracton is only one of many influential legal scholars whose 
early writings on the insanity defense impacted the development of the common 
law. See generally Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S Ct. 1021, 1030–32 (2020); see also id. 
at 1040–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 33. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.1. 
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be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and 
memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than 
an infant, . . . a brute, or a wild beast . . . .”34 This archaic 
standard for insanity seems representative of the era in 
which it was created; however, it would not survive into the 
nineteenth century due to the work of the zealous advocate, 
Lord Thomas Erskine. 
 In 1800, Erskine represented James Hadfield, a 
defendant charged with the attempted assassination of King 
George III while he was attending the theater.35 Erskine 
presented evidence that Hadfield suffered a brain injury in 
battle, which caused a disturbed mental condition. That 
condition manifested in Hadfield’s belief that he could save 
the world by taking his own life, but not wanting to kill 
himself, Hadfield instead chose to attempt to assassinate the 
king, which he knew was punishable by death.36 Erskine won 
the case after advancing a standard for insanity sometimes 
called the “offspring of a delusion test.” That test did not 
require “total insanity.” Instead, it stated that the defendant 
should be acquitted if his conduct was the offspring of his 
disease.37 
The verdict in the Hadfield case was notable for the 
subsequent enactment of The Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800. 
Before Hadfield’s case, defendants acquitted by reason of 
insanity were legally entitled to release unless they could be 
confined civilly.38 Four days after Hadfield’s acquittal, a bill 
was presented that would mandate the continued 
confinement of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity.39 
 
 34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); AAPL Practice Guideline, supra 
note 30, at S4–S5 (emphasis omitted). 
 35. See Richard Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial 
for Treason of James Hadfield (1800), 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 487, 492–93 (1985). 
 36. Id. at 493, 504–08. 
 37. Id. at 503; AAPL Practice Guidelines, supra note 30, at S5. 
 38. Moran, supra note 35, at 487–88. 
 39. Id. at 511. 
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The Act was made retroactive to apply to Hadfield. It further 
provided that those acquitted by reason of insanity would be 
kept in custody until “His Majesty’s Pleasure Be Known.”40 
Unsurprisingly, King George III did not express his 
“pleasure” for Hadfield’s release, and Hadfield was confined 
until his death in 1841.41 
 In 1800 it may have seemed like James Hadfield would 
go down in history as the attempted assassin who shaped the 
insanity defense. Two men, however, would come to share 
that title with Hadfield—each unsuccessfully attempting to 
assassinate a world leader, each successfully raising an 
insanity defense, and each causing a legislative backlash 
more severe than the last. 
D. The M’Naghten Rule 
In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten42 attempted to assassinate 
Sir Robert Peel, the British Prime Minister.43 M’Naghten 
believed that Peel was conspiring with the Tory Party to 
persecute him. He instead killed Edward Drummond, Peel’s 
secretary, whom he mistook for Peel.44 At trial, a jury found 
M’Naghten not guilty by reason of insanity.45 The public was 
outraged by the verdict. They were not alone. In response to 
M’Naghten’s acquittal, Queen Victoria summoned the House 
of Lords to set a legal standard for the insanity defense.46 
The Lords presented five questions regarding the insanity 
defense to a panel of judges, and what we now know as the 
 
 40. Id. at 513. 
 41. Id. at 516 n.24. 
 42. Various spellings for M’Naghten’s name exist, but “M’Naghten” is the 
“customary spelling.” Bernard L. Diamond, On the Spelling of Daniel 
M’Naghten’s Name, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 84, 84 (1964). 
 43. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.2; AAPL Practice Guideline, 
supra note 30, at S5. 
 44. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S5. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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M’Naghten rule was derived from two of the judges’ 
responses: 
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be proved 
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was 
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as 
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he 
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.47 
The M’Naghten rule was widely influential in the 
development of American jurisprudence on the insanity 
defense. Several variations have developed, but in its pure 
form, the M’Naghten rule is defined by lack of cognition. For 
the defendant to be acquitted by reason of insanity, the 
M’Naghten rule requires that as the result of a mental 
illness, the defendant either did not know (1) the nature and 
quality of the act committed; or (2) that the act was wrong.48 
The defendant’s lack of cognition is measured at the time the 
crime occurred. In the United States, the M’Naghten rule 
was the standard test for insanity in nearly all jurisdictions 
until the mid-1900s, and it remains the rule with some 
variation in many jurisdictions today, including in New 
York.49 
E. Alternatives to the M’Naghten Rule 
1. The Irresistible Impulse Test 
A volitional standard called the irresistible impulse test 
can be traced back to 1840 England in the case of Regina v. 
Oxford.50 The Oxford case is also notable for being one of the 
first in which medical expert witnesses were allowed to state 
 
 47. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.2; AAPL Practice Guideline, 
supra note 30, at S5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.2. 
 49. Id.; see also Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1051 (2020) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (Appendix classifying seventeen states and the federal government 
as currently using the M’Naghten test for the insanity defense). 
 50. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.1, n.73; AAPL Practice 
Guideline, supra note 30, at S5. 
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their opinion on the sanity or insanity of the accused.51 
The irresistible impulse test asks whether a defendant 
was able to conform his or her conduct to the law, regardless 
of whether the defendant is able to understand the nature of 
the offense or that it was wrong.52 The first American case to 
adopt the test was Parsons v. State, decided by the Supreme 
Court of Alabama in 1887.53 At its peak popularity, the 
irresistible impulse test was adopted by approximately 
eighteen jurisdictions.54 The irresistible impulse test proved 
to be better in theory than in practice, however, because of 
the difficulty in distinguishing between an irresistible 
impulse and an impulse not resisted.55 For example, if a 
schizophrenic defendant has delusions that his neighbor is 
conspiring against him and hears voices telling him to kill 
his neighbor, and then does kill his neighbor, the jury would 
be tasked under the irresistible impulse test with 
determining whether the defendant could have resisted the 
impulse to kill his neighbor. As of 1990, no United States 
jurisdiction uses the irresistible impulse test as its sole 
standard for the insanity defense.56 
2. The Product Test 
The product test was developed by New Hampshire 
Supreme Court Justice Charles Doe.57 Instead of specifying 
 
 51. See Frank R. Freemon, The Origin of the Medical Expert Witness: The 
Insanity of Edward Oxford, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 349, 368–73 (2001). 
 52. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.3. 
 53. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6 (citing Parsons v. State, 2 
So. 854 (Ala. 1887)). 
 54. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.3. 
 55. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 191; PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, 
at § 14-1.2.3. 
 56. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6. Three states—Georgia, 
New Mexico, and Virginia—use the M’Naghten test but include an element of 
“volitional incapacity.” See Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. at 1052–54 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 57. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.4 (quoting State v. Pike, 49 
N.H. 399, 442 (1870) (Doe, J., dissenting)). 
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a cognitive or volitional measure of insanity, the product test 
as articulated by Doe in 1870 simply states that “if [an act] 
was the offspring or product of mental disease in the 
defendant, [the defendant is] not guilty by reason of 
insanity.”58 Although it was praised by academics, the 
product test was not adopted by any other jurisdiction until 
the 1954 case Durham v. United States, decided by District 
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion authored 
by Judge David Bazelon.59 Durham was heavily criticized, 
however, and in 1972 it was overruled by United States v. 
Brawner, a decision in which Judge Bazelon concurred, and 
replaced by the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code 
test.60 Only New Hampshire and the Virgin Islands currently 
use some form of the product test for insanity.61 
F. The American Law Institute’s Test 
When the D.C. Circuit replaced the product test in 
Brawner, it joined the majority of federal courts of appeals in 
adopting the American Law Institute’s proposal.62 In 1950, 
some form of the M’Naghten test was being used by 
approximately two-thirds of states, many of which added 
some volitional element, such as an irresistible impulse 
component.63 In 1955, the American Law Institute 
[hereinafter “ALI”] proposed a new test for the insanity 
defense as part of its Model Penal Code.64 The ALI’s proposal 
would eventually become as widely influential as the 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (citing Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)). 
 60. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 191–92; PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 
12, at § 14-1.2.4 (citing United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
 61. See generally State v. Fichera, 903 A.2d 1030, 1034 (N.H. 2006); AAPL 
Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S5. 
 62. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.5. 
 63. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6. 
 64. Id. 
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M’Naghten test.65 
The ALI’s Model Penal Code states that “[a] person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law.”66 The ALI test is a combination of the M’Naghten test 
and the irresistible impulse test.67 Unlike the M’Naghten 
test, the ALI test contains a volitional element similar to the 
irresistible impulse test: the defendant is not guilty even if 
he or she can appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct, but 
cannot conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the 
law.68  
Interestingly, the ALI’s Model Penal Code standard 
prohibited “an abnormality manifested only by repeated 
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct” from being used as 
the underlying “mental disease or defect.”69 This was widely 
seen as an attempt to prevent “psychopaths” or “sociopaths” 
from using the insanity defense to exonerate themselves.70 
Some states have excluded antisocial personality disorder, or 
even all personality disorders, from the “mental disease or 
defect” that forms the basis of the insanity defense.71 
The ALI’s Model Penal Code test was generally praised 
and considered at the time to be superior to the M’Naghten 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2020). 
 67. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6. 
 68. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.5; AAPL Practice 
Guideline, supra note 30, at S6. 
 69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2). 
 70. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.5. 
 71. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 196; Natalie Jacewicz, Does a 
Psychopath Who Kills Get To Use the Insanity Defense?, NPR (Aug. 3, 2016), 
available at https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/03/486669552/do 
es-a-psychopath-who-kills-get-to-use-the-insanity-defense. 
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test due to its incorporation of a volitional element.72 The ALI 
test was eventually adopted in some form by over half the 
states and all but one federal circuit.73 The widespread 
popularity of the ALI test was irrevocably altered, however, 
with the 1982 acquittal of John Hinckley Jr., which changed 
the landscape of the insanity defense in the United States.74 
Despite the differences between the M’Naghten test and 
the Model Penal Code test, it is questionable whether the 
differences in the tests make any difference as a practical 
matter. That is, there is some evidence that the particular 
insanity test that jurors are instructed to apply “actually 
makes little difference to the verdict they return.”75 
Empirical research has certain limitations, but generally 
suggests that the type of insanity instruction received by 
jurors matters little to the insanity acquittal rate, and some 
researchers have concluded that “any differences that exist 
between the ALI and [the M’Naghten] standard may be 
practically meaningless.”76 
G. The Doctrine of Diminished Capacity 
Some states that apply the M’Naghten rule have 
attempted to broaden their standards through the use of the 
doctrine of “diminished capacity.” First developed in 
California,77 the doctrine of diminished capacity does not 
function as an excuse like the insanity defense. Instead, 
diminished capacity is typically raised to challenge the 
mental element, or mens rea, required for criminal 
conviction, even if the defendant has not raised an insanity 
 
 72. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.5.  
 73. See id.; AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6. 
 74. See AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6. 
 75. Stephen P. Garvey, Agency and Insanity, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 126 n.18 
(2018). 
 76. See James R. P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on 
Juror Decision Making, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 511–12, 526 (1991). 
 77. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.6. 
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defense.78  
It is generally the prosecution’s burden to prove that a 
defendant had the necessary mens rea as an element of the 
crime. This has caused one court to remark that the doctrine 
of diminished capacity is “not a defense at all but merely a 
rule of evidence.”79 In New York, for example, the defendant 
may present evidence of a mental disease or defect in an 
attempt to negate the intent element of the charged crime, 
but that does not relieve the prosecution of the burden to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant could 
and did have the requisite intent.80 In some states, however, 
the doctrine of diminished capacity is used to convict the 
defendant of a lower grade of offense that does not require 
proof of the contested state of mind.81 This variant is 
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of “diminished 
responsibility,” and is the version that was formerly in place 
in California.82 
The doctrine of diminished capacity has fallen out of 
favor after criticisms regarding its arbitrary application.83 
Even California, the birthplace of the doctrine, has 
legislatively abolished it.84 In California today, a jury may 
not consider evidence of a mental disease or defect with 
respect to a defendant’s capacity to form the requisite intent, 
but may consider a mental disease or defect with respect to 
whether the defendant actually formed the requisite intent.85 
 
 78. See id. 
 79. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 
U.S. 1011 (1988). 
 80. See, e.g., People v. Segal, 429 N.E.2d 107, 110 (N.Y. 1981). 
 81. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 205–06; Peter Arenella, The 
Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a 
Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 828–30 (1977). 
 82. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 205–06. 
 83. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.6. 
 84. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(b) (West 2003). 
 85. Id.; see, e.g., People v. Williams, 941 P.2d 752, 777 (Cal. 1997). 
2020] THE INSANITY DEFENSE 821 
One explanation for the disapproval of the doctrine of 
diminished capacity in California is Dan White’s famous use 
of the doctrine during his 1979 trial for killing two popular 
political figures: San Francisco Supervisor Harvey Milk and 
Mayor George Moscone.86 At trial, White’s attorneys 
presented the testimony of four psychiatrists and one 
psychologist, all of whom agreed that White was suffering 
from “serious depression” when he killed Moscone and 
Milk.87 Three of those experts opined that as a result of his 
depression, White was incapable of premeditating, an 
element required for White to be convicted of first-degree 
murder.88 White was convicted of two counts of voluntary 
manslaughter—a far less serious crime—and the public 
outrage was compounded by the relatively light sentence he 
received, which allowed him to be paroled after 
approximately five years.89 
Although it was only briefly mentioned at trial and far 
from the foundation of White’s defense, one of White’s expert 
witnesses mentioned that White’s indulgence in junk food 
like Twinkies was a sign of his depression.90 In other words, 
the expert testified that White’s Twinkie consumption was 
an effect, rather than a cause, of his depression.91 The media 
nevertheless sensationalized the “Twinkie defense,” and it 
has been used ever since as a euphemism for a fraudulent 
excuse for criminal behavior.92 The California legislature 
abolished the diminished capacity defense two years later in 
1981, and in 1985, a year after he was paroled, Dan White 
 
 86. CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL: GREAT 
CASES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY, 70–74 (2006). 
 87. Id. at 75. 
 88. Id. at 74–75. 
 89. See id. at 78. 
 90. Id. at 75–76. 
 91. Id. at 76. 
 92. Id. at 69–70, 77–79. 
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committed suicide.93 The expert witness who discussed 
White’s consumption of junk food during the trial said years 
later, “If I found a cure for cancer, they’d still say I was the 
guy who invented ‘the Twinkie defense.’”94 
H. The Impact of the Hinckley Case 
1. United States v. Hinckley 
John Hinckley, Jr. first became withdrawn and isolated 
from his peers in high school and continued to mentally 
deteriorate into adulthood.95 After a few unsuccessful 
attempts at college, Hinckley moved to Hollywood where he 
developed an obsession with the movie Taxi Driver and with 
actress Jodie Foster.96 In the film, the male lead plots to 
assassinate a presidential candidate to win the affection of a 
love interest.97 Hinckley’s obsession led to the stalking of 
Foster, and he began planning a presidential assassination 
of his own.98 Hinckley first targeted Jimmy Carter, but 
turned his attention toward Ronald Reagan following the 
1980 election.99 In 1981, Hinckley traveled to D.C. and 
attacked Reagan, firing several shots that hit a police officer, 
a secret service agent, Reagan and his press secretary.100 All 
of the victims initially survived the attack.101 Press Secretary 
James Brady died from his injuries in 2014.102 
 
 93. Id. at 79. 
 94. Id. at 80. 
 95. See id. at 92. 
 96. Id. at 92–93. 
 97. Id. at 92. 
 98. Id. at 93. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 95. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Peter Hermann & Michael Ruane, Medical Examiner Rules James 
Brady’s Death a Homicide, Wash. Post (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.washington 
post.com/local/crime/james-bradys-death-ruled-homicide-by-dc-medical-examine 
r/2014/08/08/686de224-1f41-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html?noredirect=on; 
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Hinckley pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to 
multiple counts of attempted murder.103 The trial took place 
in D.C., where the ALI’s Model Penal Code test was the 
standard for insanity.104 At trial, all the expert witnesses, 
including those who testified for the prosecution, agreed that 
Hinckley was mentally ill, although they disagreed on the 
correct diagnosis.105 The defense experts testified that 
Hinckley lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the 
law, while the prosecution’s experts disagreed.106 After three 
days of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty 
by reason of insanity.107 
2. National Response 
The verdict in the Hinckley case was met with bipartisan 
criticism and public outrage.108 Just two years later, 
Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 
with virtually no opposition.109 The Act made four major 
changes to the federal insanity defense: (1) it removed the 
volitional element of the test, (2) it shifted the burden to the 
defense to prove insanity with clear and convincing evidence, 
(3) it barred expert testimony on the ultimate issue as to 
whether or not the defendant was insane at the time of the 
crime, and (4) it provided that a defendant found not guilty 
of a crime by reason of insanity was to be confined for the 
same length of time as the maximum prison sentence for that 
 
Trevor Hughes, John Hinckley Jr. released from mental hospital after more than 
30 years, USA Today (Sept. 10, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/2016/09/10/would—reagan-assassin-john-hinckley-jr-released-menta 
l-hospital/90191312/. 
 103. See EWING & MCCANN, supra note 86, at 95. 
 104. Id. at 96. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 97–98. 
 107. Id. at 98. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 99. 
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crime, subject to judicial revision if the defendant recovers 
from the illness.110 
After the Hinckley verdict, two prominent professional 
organizations also changed their positions on the insanity 
defense. The American Psychiatric Association took the 
position that the insanity defense should be limited to the 
most severe cases of mental illness and that the insanity 
defense should not include a volitional element.111 The 
American Medical Association took the position that the 
insanity defense should be abolished and that mental illness 
should be used only to argue that the defendant lacked the 
required mens rea.112 Both the APA and the AMA would later 
rescind these positions in 2007 and 2005, respectively.113 
3. State Reforms 
In the wake of the Hinckley trial, thirty-six states in total 
altered their insanity defense in some form.114 Five states—
Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Utah, and Nevada—abolished the 
insanity defense as an affirmative defense, although 
Nevada’s Supreme Court reinstated the insanity defense in 
2001.115 Several other states shifted the burden to prove 
insanity to the defendant, others modified their test for 
insanity, and others adopted the verdict of “guilty but 
mentally ill.”116 
 
 110. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1986); EWING & MCCANN, supra note 86, at 99; see also 
AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S7–S8. 
 111. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at S7. 
 115. Id.; see generally Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001). Idaho, Kansas, 
Montana, and Utah allow a defendant to introduce evidence of mental illness to 
show that the defendant was incapable of forming the intent required to commit 
the crime, thereby negating an element of the crime—the mens rea—that the 
prosecution must prove for the defendant to be convicted. See Kahler v. Kansas, 
140 S. Ct. at 1026 n.3. 
 116. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 86, at 99; AAPL Practice Guideline, supra 
note 30, at S8. 
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4. Guilty but Mentally Ill 
A “guilty but mentally ill” verdict allows a jury to find a 
defendant guilty of a crime where the defendant was not 
legally insane at the time of the crime but suffered from some 
form of mental illness not rising to the level of insanity.117 
Approximately a dozen states adopted “guilty but mentally 
ill” as a possible verdict in the wake of the Hinckley trial.118  
The “guilty but mentally ill” verdict has been criticized 
as a compromise verdict that jurors choose when they do not 
wish to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.119 
Some studies conducted with mock juries have shown that 
jurors tend to favor guilty but mentally ill verdicts when they 
are available.120 
Critics note that although those found guilty but 
mentally ill are supposed to receive mental health treatment 
in prison, this occurs at the discretion of the correctional 
facility.121 Supporters of the guilty but mentally ill verdict, 
by contrast, have characterized it as a means of filling a gap 
with a verdict for defendants who deserve to be imprisoned 
but also are in need of treatment.122 
5. Hinckley’s Release 
In 2016, at the age of sixty-one,123 John Hinckley was 
released from confinement thirty-five years after he 
attempted to assassinate President Reagan.124 At the time 
 
 117. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.7. 
 118. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 751–52 nn.19 & 21 (2006); Natalie 
Jacewicz, ‘Guilty But Mentally Ill’ Doesn’t Protect Against Harsh Sentences, NPR 
(Aug. 2, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/02/ 
486632201/guilty-but-mentally-ill-doesnt-protect-against-harsh-sentences. 
 119. Jacewicz, supra note 118. 
 120. Id. 
 121. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.7. 
 122. Jacewicz, supra note 118. 
 123. Hughes, supra note 102. 
 124. Jacewicz, supra note 118. 
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Hinckley was released, officials at the hospital he had been 
housed in said that his mental illness had been in remission 




 125. Jacewicz, supra note 12. 
 126. Hughes, supra note 102. 
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II. NEW YORK STATE’S INSANITY DEFENSE 
A. History of New York’s Insanity Defense 
1. Early Case Law 
As early as 1829, New York law declared that “[n]o act 
done by a person in a state of insanity can be punished as an 
offense,” but that law did not define insanity.127 In 1845, a 
New York court charged a jury under the M’Naghten rule for 
the insanity defense.128 
The case widely attributed as establishing the 
M’Naghten rule as the test for the insanity defense in New 
York is Freeman v. People.129 In that case, the defendant, 
“the illiterate grandson of a former slave,” had murdered a 
prominent family in Auburn, New York.130 The defendant 
entered a plea of insanity, and he was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death.131 In 1847, the Supreme Court of 
Judicature, in an exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, 
ordered a new trial and held that the M’Naghten standard 
was the proper one to apply for the insanity defense.132 In 
Flanagan v. People, decided in 1873, the New York Court of 
Appeals, created in 1847 as the highest court in New York 
state, reaffirmed that M’Naghten was the proper test and 
rejected a request to adopt the irresistible impulse test.133 
  
 
 127. N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. VII, § 2 (1829); see also ROBERT ALLAN 
CARTER, HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK STATE 2 (1982). 
 128. Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, Literature as Law: The History of the Insanity 
Plea and a Fictional Application within the Law & Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L. 
REV. 381, 413–14 (1999) (citing People v. Kleim, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13, 25–26 
(1845)). 
 129. Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (1847); see also Hawkins-Leon, supra note 
128, at 415; CARTER, supra note 127, at 2–3. 
 130. Hawkins-Leon, supra note 128, at 415. 
 131. See Freeman, 4 Denio at 18; Hawkins-Leon, supra note 128, at 415. 
 132. See Freeman, 4 Denio at 28–29. 
 133. Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y. 467, 469–70 (1873). 
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2. Codification and Modernization of M’Naghten 
The M’Naghten rule was codified by the legislature in 
1881.134 In the 1915 case of People v. Schmidt, Judge 
Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the Court of Appeals, declined 
to grant a new trial to a defendant who claimed that he 
merely feigned insanity at his first trial in an attempt to 
obtain an acquittal, and Judge Cardozo opined that New 
York’s statutory iteration of the M’Naghten rule would likely 
apply where the defendant knows that the act is legally 
wrong but does not appreciate that it is morally wrong.135 
The statute remained largely unchanged until 1965. 
Governor Harriman became aware of the shortcomings of the 
M’Naghten rule as a result of a clemency hearing following 
the Court of Appeals’s affirmance in the case of People v. 
Horton, decided in 1954.136 Governor Harriman created a 
commission to examine possible changes to the insanity 
defense, whose work culminated in the 1958 “Foster 
Report.”137 The Foster Report noted three major objections to 
the M’Naghten rule: 
First, it was reported that a difficulty arose in the use of the word 
“know” in M’Naghten because a defendant might be able to 
verbalize that some act is wrong and yet have no depth of 
understanding as to what this means. Another defect with 
M’Naghten was said to be its emphasis on the actor’s cognitive 
capacity. The commission noted that the M’Naghten test 
disregarded the notion that an individual might have minimal 
awareness of some fact and at the same time lack the ability to 
control his conduct in light of this. Finally, the commission stated 
 
 134. Hawkins-Leon, supra note 128, at 417 (citing 1881 N.Y. Laws 676, §§ 20–
23). 
 135. See People v Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 339–40 (1915). For a thorough 
account of the bizarre Schmidt case and Judge Cardozo’s role in it, see RICHARD 
POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO: PERSONAL VALUES AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS, 71–81 (1997). 
 136. People v. Adams, 257 N.E.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. 1970) (citing People v. Horton, 
123 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y. 1954)); see also CARTER, supra note 127, at 9–10; Clemency 
Plea for Horton Based on Insanity Claim, ELMIRA STAR-GAZETTE, Jan. 12, 1955, 
at 8. 
 137. Adams, 257 N.E.2d at 611. 
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that M’Naghten taken on its face called for a total impairment of 
ability to know, whereas in even the most extreme psychoses it is 
impossible to say that the actor was totally bereft of knowledge or 
control.138 
The Foster Report recommended adoption of the ALI’s 
Model Penal Code standard with some adaptation, and in 
1963, the Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal 
Law and Criminal Code issued an interim report adopting 
the recommendations of the Foster Report.139 That 
recommendation, however, was strongly opposed, 
particularly by district attorneys.140 In 1965, former Penal 
Law § 1120 was amended to substantially the same version 
of the insanity defense that exists today.141 The revised 
statute provided that a defendant was not guilty by reason 
of insanity if, at the time of the criminal conduct, by reason 
of mental disease or defect, the defendant “lack[ed] 
substantial capacity to know or appreciate either: (a) [t]he 
nature and consequence of such conduct; or (b) [t]hat such 
conduct was wrong.”142 
The revised standard was substantially similar to the 
M’Naghten rule, but with some important differences. Lack 
of “substantial capacity” was considered a more realistic 
standard than the total incapacity required by the 
M’Naghten rule.143 In addition, the word “appreciate” was 
intended to apply to a defendant with some minimal, surface 
awareness that an act is wrong but who nevertheless is 
unable to understand the “legal and moral import of the 
conduct involved.”144 With respect to the meaning of 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.; see also CARTER, supra note 127, at 11–12; INTERIM REP. OF 
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF PENAL LAW AND CRIM. CODE, Leg. Doc. No. 8 at 24–
25 (1963). 
 140. Adams, 257 N.E.2d at 612. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1120 (amended 1965)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“appreciate,” the Court of Appeals has stated that a jury may 
be instructed that mere surface knowledge, such as “the type 
of knowledge children have of propositions which they can 
state, but cannot understand,” is not sufficient to satisfy the 
“appreciate” requirement.145 
3. 1980s Changes 
Other significant changes to New York’s insanity defense 
occurred in the 1980s. In 1980, the legislature passed the 
Insanity Defense Reform Act, which implemented many 
recommendations made by the Law Revision Commission.146 
The bill contained New York’s first comprehensive 
procedural laws for the use of the insanity defense,147 and 
was, in part, a response to the case of Robert Torsney.148 
In 1976, after responding to a call at a housing project 
but finding the issue already resolved, Torsney, a white 
NYPD officer, calmly and inexplicably shot an unarmed 
black teenager in the head after the youth asked about the 
police presence.149 Torsney initially claimed self-defense, but 
at trial, he argued insanity based on the testimony of a 
forensic psychiatrist who opined that despite no documented 
history of mental illness, Torsney suffered a psychosis 
associated with an imperceptible epileptic seizure at the very 
moment of the shooting.150 An all-white jury found Torsney 
not guilty by reason of insanity.151 Torsney was committed to 
 
 145. Id. at 613; see also Insanity, supra note 16. 
 146. 1980 N.Y. Laws 1616, ch. 548; 1980 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1879–80 (McKinney) 
(Memorandum from Gov. Hugh Carey approving the Insanity Defense Reform 
Act). 
 147. Compare 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 548, § 11 (enacting modern version of N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20) with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney 1971). 
 148. Hawkins-Leon, supra note 128, at 425–26; see also Dorothy Spektorov 
McClellan, The New York State Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980: A Legislative 
Experiment, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 129, 143–44 (1989). 
 149. EWING, supra note 3, at 22. 
 150. Id. at 24–28. 
 151. Id. at 29. 
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a psychiatric facility but spent only a year and a half there, 
after doctors were unable to detect any continuing mental 
illness besides a personality disorder and impulse control 
issues.152 The legislature subsequently passed the Insanity 
Defense Reform Act in 1980 in part as a response to the 
Torsney case.153 
Before the 1980 Insanity Defense Reform Act, review for 
discharge or release of defendants found not guilty by reason 
of insanity and confined in a psychiatric institution was 
initiated by application, filed either by the patient or by the 
commissioner of mental hygiene.154 Transfers and furlough 
were left to administrative discretion, and no particular 
Office of Mental Health regulations controlled the post-
verdict procedure.155 After the 1980 Act, and under the 
current version of CPL § 330.20, patients found not guilty by 
reason of insanity are regularly reviewed for discharge or 
release, and all furloughs, transfers, releases, and discharges 
must be accomplished by court order after thorough 
evaluation.156 
Although the same Law Revision Commission Report 
that led to the 1980 Insanity Defense Reform Act rejected 
proposals to reclassify insanity as an affirmative defense,157 
in 1984, in part as a response to the Hinckley verdict, the 
New York legislature made insanity an affirmative 
 
 152. See In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d 262, 263–70 (N.Y. 1979); EWING, supra note 
3, at 30–32. 
 153. See, e.g., 1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2262 (McKinney) (1980 Report of Law 
Revision Commission on The Defense of Insanity in New York State, citing the 
Torsney case for the proposition that N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 “needs a 
complete overhaul.”). 
 154. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney 1971). 
 155. See id.; see also McClellan, supra note 148, at 132–33. 
 156. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney 2019); McClellan, supra 
note 148, at 133–34. 
 157. See 1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2256–59 (1980 Report of Law Revision 
Commission on The Defense of Insanity in New York State). 
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defense.158 Before 1984, the prosecution had the burden to 
prove that the defendant was sane beyond a reasonable 
doubt, although the prosecution could nevertheless rely to 
some extent on a presumption of sanity.159 Since the 1984 
amendment, the defendant now has the burden to prove his 
or her insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.160 The 
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of that 
change.161 
B. The Battle of the Experts 
1. The Significance and Limitations of Expert 
Testimony 
Testimony from experts in psychology or psychiatry “is a 
staple in virtually all insanity trials.”162 In New York courts, 
an expert witness must be permitted to state his or her 
opinion with respect to “the extent, if any, to which the 
capacity of the defendant to know or appreciate the nature 
and consequence of such conduct, or its wrongfulness, was 
impaired as a result of mental disease or defect at that 
time.”163 Such testimony on the “ultimate issue” is prohibited 
in the federal courts.164 
Some of the limitations on expert testimony are 
illustrated by the case of Andrew Goldstein. In 1999, 
Goldstein pushed Kendra Webdale off of a New York City 
subway platform in front of an oncoming train, which hit and 
 
 158. 1984 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1973–75 (McKinney) (L 1984, ch. 668); see also 1984 
N.Y. Sess. Laws 3399 (McKinney) (Memorandum of Legis. Rep. of N.Y.C. on 
L 1984, ch. 668, mentioning the Hinckley case as an example of recent events that 
have “dramatically exposed the dangers of the insanity defense as currently 
formulated”); see also Bill Jacket, L 1984, ch. 668 (containing several mentions of 
the Hinckley verdict). 
 159. See People v. Silver, 310 N.E.2d 520, 522 (N.Y. 1974). 
 160. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2), 40.15 (McKinney 2019). 
 161. People v. Kohl, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 1182 (N.Y. 1988). 
 162. EWING, supra note 3, at 22. 
 163. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.55(1) (McKinney 2019). 
 164. FED. R. EVID. 704(b). 
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killed her on impact.165 Webdale was a University at Buffalo 
graduate who grew up in Upstate New York.166 Goldstein 
had been in and out of psychiatric hospitals over a dozen 
times with various diagnoses, including paranoid 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder with psychotic 
features.167 
Goldstein’s first trial ended in a hung jury.168 During the 
second trial, the prosecution’s strategy was to concede that 
Goldstein had a “relatively mild” mental illness, but to argue 
that his killing of Webdale was a result of his hatred of 
women, not his mental illness.169 To that end, an expert 
witness for the prosecution testified as to what she was told 
by various people from Goldstein’s past about Goldstein’s 
prior assaults and sexually inappropriate conduct with 
women.170 After his second trial, Goldstein was convicted and 
sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison.171 On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals held that the expert’s testimony 
regarding what others had told her was testimonial 
hearsay—that is, a statement made out of court by another 
person, offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and 
intended for use at trial—and therefore inadmissible.172 The 
Court further held that admission of the testimonial hearsay 
statements through the prosecution’s expert could not be 
considered harmless inasmuch as the People’s case “drew 
some significant support from the improperly admitted 
statements.”173 After he was granted a third trial by the 
 
 165. EWING, supra note 3, at 116. 
 166. Id. at 114. 
 167. Id. at 114–15. 
 168. Id. at 120. 
 169. Id. at 117, 121. 
 170. See People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 729–30 (N.Y. 2005); EWING, 
supra note 3, at 123–24. 
 171. EWING, supra note 3, at 124. 
 172. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d at 732–33; EWING, supra note 3, at 125–26. 
 173. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d at 734. 
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Court of Appeals, Goldstein pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter.174 
Goldstein was recently released from prison, and it is 
possible that he may be subject to “Kendra’s Law,” a law 
passed in the wake of Kendra Webdale’s death that allows 
for court-ordered assisted outpatient therapy for mentally ill 
individuals with a history of hospitalizations or violence.175 
2. The Ethics of Expert Testimony 
In its Practice Guideline for Forensic Psychiatric 
Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law [hereinafter 
“AAPL”] discusses ethical issues faced by expert witnesses 
testifying in a criminal trial where the defendant has raised 
an insanity defense. For example, while psychiatrists 
generally owe a duty to their patient, the AAPL states that a 
forensic psychiatrist retained by the defense owes a duty to 
the defense attorney.176 Additionally, while a psychiatrist 
usually operates under a duty of confidentiality, forensic 
psychiatrists retained by the prosecution must warn the 
defendant that evaluations are not confidential and may be 
used against him or her.177 Furthermore, the AAPL states 
that a forensic psychiatrist has a duty to “further the 
interests of justice, regardless of the identity of the retaining 
party.”178 
 
 174. EWING, supra note 3, at 127. 
 175. See In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 482 (N.Y. 2004); NEW YORK STATE OFFICE 
OF MENTAL HEALTH, KENDRA’S LAW: FINAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ASSISTED 
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 1 (2005), https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/kendra_web/ 
finalreport/intro.htm; Ali Watkins, A Horrific Crime on the Subway Led to 
Kendra’s Law. Years Later, Has it Helped?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/nyregion/kendras-law-andrew-goldstein-
subway-murder.html. 
 176. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S18. 
 177. See id. at S19. 
 178. Id. 
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Although not true in all jurisdictions,179 in New York, the 
prosecution is permitted to call a psychiatrist who has 
treated the defendant even if that expert is not called to 
testify by the defense, because by asserting an insanity 
defense, the defendant makes a “complete and effective 
waiver . . . of any claim of privilege.”180 Defense counsel may 
consult with a psychiatrist “in order to obtain advice 
concerning the efficacy of an insanity plea . . . without fear of 
later courtroom disclosure,” but only facts and observations 
“disclosed by the attorney” are subject to a work product 
privilege.181 The AAPL states that forensic psychiatrists 
should have sufficient knowledge of how the laws in their 
jurisdiction may affect their role in an insanity trial.182 
Professor Ewing stated in one of his books that some 
mental health experts have famously offered testimony 
regarding the insanity defense at trial that is “clinically, 
legally, or factually suspect.”183 He provides the example of 
the expert testimony about the impeccably timed epileptic 
seizure suffered by Robert Torsney, discussed earlier.184 He 
also cites the expert testimony offered by the prosecution in 
the Goldstein case, which led to a new trial, and the 
testimony offered by the defense in the case of Arthur 
Shawcross, which this Article will address shortly.185 
3. Ethical Considerations for Attorneys 
Attorneys face their own set of ethical obligations when 
it comes to psychiatric evaluations performed in connection 
with the insanity defense. When a psychiatrist retained by 
 
 179. See id. at S18. 
 180. People v. Edney, 350 N.E.2d 400, 402–03 (N.Y. 1976); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 60.55(2) (McKinney 2019). 
 181. Edney, 350 N.E.2d at 403. 
 182. See AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S18–S19. 
 183. See EWING, supra note 3, at 162. 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. 
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the prosecution in an insanity case finds that a defendant 
meets the legal criteria for insanity, the prosecution has a 
legal duty to inform the defense.186 By contrast, when a 
psychiatrist retained by the defense finds that a defendant is 
legally sane, defense counsel has no obligation to reveal that 
information to the prosecution. In fact, defense counsel has 
an ethical duty not to do so, and may seek other, more 
favorable expert opinions.187 When both prosecution and 
defense experts agree that a defendant is insane, the case 
typically does not proceed to trial unless there is some other 
issue presented,188 and the court may accept a plea of not 
responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.189 In most 
jurisdictions, if the defendant is deemed competent to stand 
trial, defense counsel cannot impose an insanity defense over 
the defendant’s objection.190 The New York Court of Appeals 
has not yet spoken on this precise issue. 
C. After a Successful Insanity Defense 
1. Jury Instruction 
New York law provides that when a defendant has raised 
the affirmative defense of not responsible by reason of 
mental disease or defect, the court must instruct the jury as 
follows, “without elaboration”: 
A jury during its deliberations must never consider or speculate 
concerning matters relating to the consequences of its verdict. 
However, because of the lack of common knowledge regarding the 
consequences of a verdict of not responsible by reason of mental 
disease or defect, I charge you that if this verdict is rendered by you 
there will be hearings as to the defendant’s present mental 
condition and, where appropriate, involuntary commitment 
 
 186. Id. at 70. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.15 (McKinney 2019). 
 190. See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.7; AAPL Practice 
Guideline, supra note 30, at S19. 
2020] THE INSANITY DEFENSE 837 
proceedings.191 
That provision was added as part of New York’s Insanity 
Defense Reform Act of 1980 in order to avoid speculation by 
the jury that a mentally ill defendant who is a danger to the 
community might be released back into the public, which 
may lead the jury to improperly convict a defendant who 
meets the requirements of the insanity defense.192 Other 
jurisdictions impose different rules regarding whether the 
jury can or must be informed of the consequences of an 
insanity acquittal.193 
2. Duration of Confinement 
In most states, when a defendant raises a successful 
insanity defense, the defendant is confined to a psychiatric 
institution with no definite release date, and is released only 
when it is safe to do so.194 Likewise, New York indefinitely 
confines forensic patients found not guilty by reason of 
insanity if, after an initial examination, the defendant is 
determined to have a dangerous mental disorder.195 New 
York does, however, regularly review such cases, 
approximately every two years, to determine whether the 
defendant should be released or placed into a less secure 
facility.196  
In New York, the statute that governs the confinement 
of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity is CPL 
§ 330.20, enacted as part of the Insanity Defense Reform Act 
 
 191. CRIM. PROC. § 300.10(3). 
 192. See 1980 N.Y. Laws 1619, ch. 548, § 8; 1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2272–73 
(McKinney) (1980 Report of Law Revision Commission on The Defense of 
Insanity in New York State). 
 193. See generally People v. Adams, 257 N.E.2d 610, 614 (N.Y. 1970) 
(discussing jury instruction before 1980 statutory enactment); PERLIN & CUCOLO, 
supra note 12, at § 14-1.3.4. 
 194. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 189; McClelland, supra note 6. 
 195. See CRIM. PROC. § 330.20; McClelland, supra note 6. 
 196. CRIM. PROC. § 330.20(h)–(i); McClelland, supra note 6. 
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of 1980, discussed earlier.197 “The postadjudication statutory 
scheme set forth in CPL § 330.20 provides three alternative 
tracks, with different treatment progressions and procedural 
consequences, based upon the hearing court’s postacquittal 
determination of a defendant’s mental condition.”198 
Defendants who are determined to have a “dangerous mental 
disorder” are classified as “track one” insanity acquittees and 
are confined in a secure facility for treatment.199 If the 
defendant is determined to be “mentally ill” but not 
dangerous, the defendant is classified as a “track two” 
insanity acquittee and may be subject to involuntary civil 
commitment in a nonsecure facility pursuant to the Mental 
Hygiene Law.200 Finally, if the court determines that the 
defendant does not have a dangerous mental disorder and is 
not mentally ill, the defendant must be released, “either 
unconditionally or subject to an order of conditions.”201 
A minority of states, including California, limit the time 
that a defendant may be involuntarily confined in a 
psychiatric institution to the maximum time the defendant 
would have served in prison if convicted, but the California 
law also allows for perpetual two-year extensions.202 In Jones 
v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that 
it does not violate due process for a defendant acquitted by 
reason of insanity to be involuntarily confined to a 
psychiatric institution “until such time as he has regained 
his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society,” even 
if the defendant is confined for much longer than the 
maximum sentence the defendant could have received if 
 
 197. See In re James Q., 120 N.E.3d 358, 360 (N.Y. 2019). 
 198. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally In re Jamie R. v. 
Consilvio, 844 N.E.2d 285, 287–88 (N.Y. 2006). 
 199. See CRIM. PROC. § 330.20(1)(c), (1)(f), (6); In re James Q., 120 N.E.3d at 
360. 
 200. See CRIM. PROC. § 330.20(1)(d), (7); In re James Q., 120 N.E.3d at 360–61; 
People v. Stone, 536 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (N.Y. 1989). 
 201. CRIM. PROC. § 330.20(7); see also James Q., 120 N.E.3d at 361. 
 202. See McClelland, supra note 6. 
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convicted of the crime.203 
3. New York’s Forensic Psychiatric Facilities 
The New York State Office of Mental Health has 
oversight of several facilities that serve “justice-involved” 
individuals.204 Of these facilities, three treat defendants 
found not responsible for criminal conduct by reason of 
mental disease or defect: Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center 
on Wards Island, Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center in 
New Hampton, and the Rochester Regional Forensic Unit, 
located at the Rochester Psychiatric Center on Elmwood 
Avenue.205 
The Rochester Regional Forensic Unit’s stated goal for 
patients found not responsible by reason of mental disease or 
defect is “to evaluate and treat their dangerous mental 
disorder . . . [and] to prepare these patients for transfer to a 
civil unit or nonsecure unit as soon as it is determined that 
they are no longer a danger to themselves or others because 
of their mental illness.”206 
D. Selection of Famous Local Cases Involving the Insanity 
Defense 
1. George Fitzsimmons 
Professor Ewing writes in his book on the insanity 
defense that when he first moved to Buffalo, New York in 
1983 and asked why the insanity defense was, at that time, 
“rarely, if ever” used in the area, local attorneys repeatedly 
 
 203. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983). 
 204. NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, DIVISION OF FORENSIC 
SERVICES, https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/forensic/bfs.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 
2020). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Rochester Psychiatric Center, Rochester Regional Forensic Unit, NEW 
YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/ 
facilities/ropc/consumers/forensic.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). 
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mentioned the name “Fitzsimmons.”207 In 1969, George 
Fitzsimmons “karate-chopped” his parents to death in the 
Buffalo suburb of Amherst.208 At the subsequent bench trial, 
a judge found Fitzsimmons not responsible by reason of 
mental disease or defect.209 Just three years after 
Fitzsimmons was acquitted and confined in a psychiatric 
hospital, a judge ordered Fitzsimmons released, after four 
psychiatrists at that hospital testified that Fitzsimmons was 
no longer a danger to himself or others.210 He was to remain 
under the supervision of the Office of Mental Hygiene for five 
years, and his release was subject to him remaining not 
dangerous to others.211 
Not long after being released, Fitzsimmons and his new 
wife moved to Pennsylvania to live with Fitsimmons’s aunt 
and uncle.212 While in Pennsylvania, Fitzsimmons seriously 
assaulted his wife, the second time he had attacked her. New 
York authorities believed that they were powerless to take 
any action.213 While awaiting sentencing on the 
Pennsylvania assault, Fitzsimmons stabbed his aunt and 
uncle to death during an argument over a television 
program.214 During the following trial, where he was 
represented by renowned criminal defense attorney F. Lee 
Bailey, Fitzsimmons again raised an insanity defense.215 
This time, a jury rejected the defense and found Fitzsimmons 
guilty of murder.216 He was sentenced to life in prison.217 
 
 207. EWING, supra note 3, at xi. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at xi–xii. 
 210. Id. at xii. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at xii. 
 213. See id. at xii–xiii. 
 214. Id. at xiii. 
 215. Id. at xiii–xiv. 
 216. Id. at xiv. 
 217. Id. 
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Western New York’s perception of the insanity defense 
was shaped by the Fitzsimmons case, and many believe that 
the Fitzsimmons case is typical of an insanity case.218 Asked 
in 2000 whether the insanity defense was “dead” in Buffalo, 
the late criminal defense attorney John Nuchereno 
responded, “It’s not dead, but its heart beats very weakly.”219 
2. Arthur Shawcross 
In 1972, Arthur Shawcross admitted to killing two 
children in the Watertown, New York area.220 Due to 
concerns over the admissibility of his statements and the 
weak evidence against him, the prosecution offered 
Shawcross a plea deal in which he would plead guilty to 
manslaughter for killing one of the children.221 In 1987, after 
14 years in prison, Shawcross was released to parole 
supervision.222 His parole officer warned his superiors that 
he considered Shawcross to be “possibly the most dangerous 
individual to have been released to this community in many 
years.”223 
Shawcross was settled in Rochester in 1987 by parole 
officials.224 Over the next two years, Shawcross raped and 
killed 11 women.225 He was finally apprehended in 1990 after 
he returned to the scene of one of his crimes.226 Shawcross 
gave a detailed confession to each murder.227 
 
 218. Id. at xiv–xv. 
 219. Id. at xv (quoting Gene Warner, Insanity Plea on Life Support, BUFFALO 
NEWS (Feb. 29, 2000), https://buffalonews.com/2000/02/28/insanity-plea-on-life-
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 220. Id. at 64–66. 
 221. Id. at 65–66. 
 222. Id. at 66. 
 223. Id. at 67. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 68. 
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The defense vigorously pursued an insanity defense. 
Counsel retained two expert psychiatrists to evaluate 
Shawcross, and when both refused to testify that Shawcross 
was insane, the defense found one who would.228 Using 
techniques such as hypnotism, the defense expert heard 
Shawcross’s increasing unbelievable tales of childhood 
violence and atrocities witnessed and perpetrated during the 
Vietnam War, and she diagnosed him with post-traumatic 
stress disorder so severe that it caused him to enter a 
“dissociative state” during his murders.229 On cross-
examination, the expert admitted that she did not use 
standard procedures for the hypnosis, did not verify that the 
traumatic events Shawcross relayed to her ever occurred, 
and did not discuss each of the killings with Shawcross 
because they were “not distinct.”230 The prosecution expert, 
by contrast, pointed out that many of the events Shawcross 
relayed to the defense expert were “impossible,” and 
diagnosed Shawcross with antisocial personality disorder, 
“the modern-day version of what was formerly called a 
psychopath or sociopath.”231 The jury rejected the insanity 
defense, and Shawcross was sentenced to a minimum term 
of 250 years’ imprisonment.232 
3. Gail Trait 
The case of Gail Trait is another famous insanity case 
out of Buffalo. In 1978, Trait killed her four children in a 
“voodoo-style” ritual.233 After a jury rejected her insanity 
defense, Trait was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in 
 
 228. Id. at 69–70. 
 229. Id. at 71–72. 
 230. Id. at 74–75. 
 231. Id. at 76–78. 
 232. Id. at 79. 
 233. Matt Gryta, Trait, Convicted of Killing Her 4 Children, Fights New Trial, 
BUFFALO NEWS (Oct. 24, 1988), https://buffalonews.com/1988/10/24/trait-
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prison, where she received treatment for schizophrenia.234 
Ten years later, however, the Appellate Division overturned 
Trait’s conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel.235 The 
court held that Trait’s counsel had been unprepared and that 
his performance had “alienated the jurors to such an extent 
that it may have had an adverse effect on their verdict.”236 
After her second trial, Trait was found not responsible by 
reason of mental disease or defect and was confined to a 
psychiatric facility.237 
4. John Justice 
John Justice was an honor student at Kenmore West 
High School when he killed his family and a stranger in 
1985.238 Justice stabbed his mother, father, and thirteen-
year-old brother to death and then intentionally rear-ended 
a car at a high speed in an alleged suicide attempt, killing 
the driver of the other car.239 At trial, he was found not guilty 
by reason of insanity in two of the deaths, and guilty of 
manslaughter in the others.240 In 2005, Justice was released 
from prison on parole, but within two years he returned to 
prison for violating the conditions of his release by 
threatening workers at a halfway house.241 After serving out 
the remaining period of his 30-year prison sentence, Justice 
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was released from prison in September 2015.242 
The state, however, successfully sought to confine 
Justice civilly, on the ground that he remained dangerously 
mentally ill.243 The civil confinement was based upon a 
“recommitment order” issued pursuant to CPL § 330.20(14), 
which allows for recommitment of the defendant to a 
psychiatric facility if the court determines that the defendant 
has a dangerous mental disorder.244 Interestingly, if Justice 
had been found guilty of all of the murders, instead of not 
guilty by reason of insanity with respect to two of the 
murders, this statutory provision would not apply.245 The 
Appellate Division affirmed the recommitment order, 
concluding that Justice’s diagnosis of antisocial personality 
disorder with narcissistic and paranoid features, coupled 
with other testimony presented by the state regarding his 
dangerousness, sufficiently demonstrated that Justice 
suffered from a dangerous mental disorder requiring 
commitment to a secure facility.246 
E. Other New York Considerations 
1. Competency under CPL Article 730 
Before a defendant may raise an insanity defense at 
trial, the defendant must be competent to stand trial. CPL 
Article 730 governs competency proceedings. The defendant 
is incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of mental disease 
or defect, the defendant “lacks capacity to understand the 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id.; Casey Seiler, Civil Confinement of Killer Upheld on Appeal, TIMES 
UNION (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Civil-confine 
ment-of-killer-upheld-on-appeal-6841098.php. 
 244. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(14) (McKinney 2019); see also In re John 
Z., 25 N.Y.S.3d 721, 722 (App. Div. 2016), appeal denied, 63 N.E.3d 71 (N.Y. 
2016). 
 245. See In re John Z., 25 N.Y.S.3d at 722. 
 246. Id. at 723–26. 
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proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.”247 
Competency is determined at the time of the criminal 
proceedings, not the time of the crime. If the defendant is 
determined to be incompetent to stand trial and has been 
charged with a felony, the criminal action is suspended and 
the defendant is committed to the custody of the Office of 
Mental Health until he or she is no longer incapacitated, for 
up to two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment, after 
which a civil commitment proceeding may be commenced.248 
2. Extreme Emotional Disturbance 
A defendant charged with murder may raise an 
affirmative defense that the defendant was “under the 
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there 
was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness 
of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person 
in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the 
defendant believed them to be.”249 If the defendant is 
successful, the conviction is reduced to manslaughter in the 
first degree.250 Like the insanity defense, the defense of 
extreme emotional disturbance often involves the 
presentation of expert psychiatric evidence, notice of which 
is required pursuant to CPL § 250.10.251 
In 2015, Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of a 
defendant who had raised an extreme emotional disturbance 
defense during his trial for murdering his ex-girlfriend and 
her current partner.252 Expert testimony on the defense was 
presented by both sides, but the jury rejected the defense 
after deliberating for three hours.253 Additionally, the New 
 
 247. CRIM. PROC. § 730.10(1).  
 248. See generally CRIM. PROC. §§ 730.50, 730.60, 730.70. 
 249. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a); see also PENAL § 125.27(2)(a).  
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 251. See CRIM. PROC. § 250.10(1)(b). 
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York State Legislature recently enacted legislation 
abolishing the so-called “gay panic” and “trans panic” 
defenses in the state, which previously allowed a homicide 
defendant to claim extreme emotional disturbance based on 
discovery or disclosure of the victim’s sexual orientation or 
gender identity.254 
3. Negating Mens Rea 
In New York, the defendant may present evidence of a 
mental disease or defect in an attempt to negate the intent 
element of the charged crime. For example, if the defendant 
is charged with murder, the defendant may argue that 
because of a mental disease or defect, the defendant was 
incapable of forming the intent to cause the death of the 
victim.255 Unlike the insanity defense, which the defendant 
has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, 
if the defendant argues that a mental illness prevented him 
or her from forming the required intent, the People are not 
relieved of the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant could and did have the requisite intent.256 
If the defendant is successful in using a mental illness to 
negate the mens rea, the defendant could be acquitted 
entirely, rather than confined in a psychiatric facility, 
because the requisite intent is an element of the crime that 
the People must prove in order to convict the defendant.257 A 
defendant attempting to use psychiatric evidence of a mental 
disease or defect to negate the mens rea must therefore give 




 254. See 2019 N.Y. Sess. Law News 760–61 (McKinney) (L 2019, ch. 45). 
 255. See, e.g., PENAL § 125.25(1). 
 256. See generally People v. Segal, 429 N.E.2d 107, 110–11 (N.Y. 1981). 
 257. See id. 
 258. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.10; see also Segal, 429 N.E.2d at 109. 
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4. Mental Health Courts in New York 
New York’s Mental Health Courts “seek to improve 
safety, court operations, and the well-being of justice-
involved individuals living with mental illness by linking 
them with court-supervised, community-based 
treatment.”259 Eligibility criteria are based on the nature of 
the criminal offense and the “nature and severity of a 
person’s mental illness.”260 There are currently twenty-nine 
mental health court locations, and the Buffalo and Rochester 
areas have several mental health courts.261 
  
 
 259. Mental Health Courts: Overview, NYCOURTS, http://ww2.nycourts.gov/ 
mental-health-courts-overview-27066. 
 260. Mental Health Courts: Key Principles, NYCOURTS, http://ww2.nycourts 
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 261. Mental Health Courts: Court Locations, NYCOURTS, http://ww2.nycourts 
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III. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT ISSUES 
There are many additional issues that a discussion of the 
insanity defense touches on that are beyond the scope of this 
Article, but that an attorney or expert witness involved in an 
insanity defense should be aware of. I will discuss them 
briefly below, although this is by no means an exhaustive 
list. 
A. Is there a Constitutional Right to the Insanity Defense? 
Eric Clark had a history of paranoid schizophrenia when 
he shot and killed a police officer in 2000.262 At trial, Arizona 
law prohibited him from presenting evidence regarding his 
mental illness insofar as he wished to argue that he was 
incapable of forming the necessary mens rea, and he was 
found guilty during a bench trial after the court rejected his 
alternative insanity defense.263 In 2006, the Supreme Court 
rejected Clark’s contention that any particular articulation 
of the insanity defense is constitutionally required by due 
process.264 The Court also held that Arizona could 
constitutionally preclude expert testimony on a diminished 
capacity defense.265 The Supreme Court expressly left open 
the issue whether the Constitution “mandates an insanity 
defense.”266 
In 2012, in Delling v. Idaho, the Supreme Court declined 
the opportunity to address whether due process requires 
states to allow some form of the insanity defense in criminal 
cases.267 Idaho is one of four states that does not recognize 
insanity as an affirmative defense, although it does allow 
 
 262. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743–45 (2006). 
 263. Id. at 744–46. 
 264. Id. at 747–56. 
 265. Id. at 770–79. 
 266. Id. at 752 n.20; see also EWING, supra note 3, at 136–40 (discussing the 
Clark case). 
 267. Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038 (2012). 
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expert evidence “on the issue of any state of mind which is 
an element of the offense.”268 Over the dissent of Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, leaving the issue open for a future case.269 
The Supreme Court largely resolved that issue in March 
2020, with its decision in Kahler v. Kansas.270 In 2009, James 
Kahler shot and killed his estranged wife, mother-in-law, 
and two daughters.271 Kahler filed a motion challenging the 
constitutionality of Kansas’ insanity statute.272 Kansas does 
not recognize insanity as an affirmative defense but allows a 
defendant to claim that, as a result of mental disease or 
defect, the defendant “lacked the culpable mental state 
required as an element of the crime charged.”273 The trial 
court denied Kahler’s motion,274 leaving him unable to argue 
that his inability to know right from wrong should excuse 
him from criminal liability. Instead, Kahler unsuccessfully 
argued at trial that his severe depression prevented him 
from forming intent, and he was convicted of capital murder 
and sentenced to death.275 
After Kahler exhausted his state court appeals, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2019.276 The Court 
considered “whether the Due Process Clause requires States 
to provide an insanity defense that acquits a defendant who 
could not ‘distinguish right from wrong’ when committing his 
crime, or, otherwise put, whether that Clause requires States 
to adopt the moral-incapacity test from M’Naghten.”277 In an 
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opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held that the Due 
Process Clause imposed no such requirement.278 
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion largely focused on the 
fact that the insanity defense varies among states and 
throughout history.279 The Court reasoned that this 
variation meant that no particular version of the insanity 
defense could be deemed fundamental, such that it violated 
due process for a state to formulate its defense differently.280 
Inasmuch as the Court considered the Kansas statute an 
alternative version of the insanity defense as opposed to an 
abolition thereof,281 the Court held that the Kansas statute 
was not unconstitutional.282 The Court observed that 
“[d]efining the precise relationship between criminal 
culpability and mental illness involves examining the 
workings of the brain, the purposes of the criminal law, the 
ideas of free will and responsibility,” and that this project 
“should be open to revision over time.”283 
Justice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.284 Justice Breyer would 
have held that Kansas had unconstitutionally “eliminated 
the core of a defense that has existed for centuries: that the 
defendant, due to mental illness, lacked the mental capacity 
necessary for his conduct to be considered morally 
blameworthy.”285 The Kahler v. Kansas decision is a 
fascinating read for any person interested in the origins and 
history of the insanity defense. 
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B. Increasing Incarceration of Mentally Ill Individuals 
The deinstitutionalization movement that began in the 
1950s was based, in part, on a benign motive: to treat mental 
illness in the least restrictive setting, and to provide 
individuals with mental illness the greatest possible amount 
of autonomy.286 The abysmal conditions at many mental 
institutions were also an alarming call to action.287 
Policymakers at the time were also overly optimistic about 
new psychotropic drugs and were attempting to decrease the 
large cost burden that public psychiatric hospitals placed on 
taxpayers.288 
One estimate states that “approximately [ninety-two] 
percent of the people who would have been living in public 
psychiatric hospitals in 1955 were not living there in 
1994.”289 Many of those who were deinstitutionalized were 
severely mentally ill and were released into the community 
without ensuring that medication, community integration 
services, and other support those individuals needed would 
be available to them.290 As a result, the nation’s population 
of individuals in psychiatric hospitals has decreased 
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exponentially, but the incarceration of mentally ill 
individuals has rapidly increased.291 The population of the 
mentally ill in the nation’s prisons and jails is difficult to 
quantify, and statistics vary, but the Department of Justice 
estimated that in 2005, “more than half of all prison and jail 
inmates had a mental health problem,”292 including less 
severe diagnoses. Some recent estimates state that 
approximately fifteen percent of inmates have a “severe” 
mental illness.293 
C. Execution of Mentally Ill Persons 
Internationally, there is strong opposition to executing 
people with severe mental illness.294 The United Nations, the 
European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights have all taken 
positions accordingly.295 Most Americans agree; 
approximately two-thirds of Americans polled expressed 
opposition to executing severely mentally ill people.296 Exact 
statistics are not available, but some organizations estimate 
that approximately twenty percent of individuals on death 
row have a severe mental illness.297 In 2006, the American 
Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological 
Association, the National Alliance on Mental Health, and the 
American Bar Association all adopted a policy opposing the 
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death penalty for defendants who suffered from severe 
mental illness at the time of their crime.298 Thus far, no 
jurisdictions with the death penalty have adopted a 
categorical exclusion for the severely mentally ill.299 
D. Community Intervention Programs 
Community intervention programs have been developed 
to attempt to reduce the incarceration and recidivism of 
mentally ill individuals involved with the criminal justice 
system. One such model is the Assertive Community 
Treatment [hereinafter “ACT”] model.300 ACT programs 
arose in the 1970s and utilize mobile treatment teams that 
provide services like housing assistance, addiction 
treatment, and employment assistance.301 Rochester’s 
Forensic Assertive Community Treatment, or R-FACT 
model, was developed at the University of Rochester. By 
targeting risk factors and using “legal leverage,” this model 
has been effective in reducing jail time and increasing 
engagement in outpatient treatment.302 
Another program, Transitions Clinic Network, employs 
former prisoners as community health workers to assist 
people leaving prison in dealing with medical, psychiatric, 
and substance abuse disorders.303 The program is rapidly 
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growing, doubling in size over the past five years, and it now 
has twenty-five health centers in eleven states and Puerto 
Rico.304 These are only two of the many community 
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CONCLUSION 
The madness that is insanity is found across a wide 
spectrum of behavior. This is why the law struggles with 
defining the defense. It is a noble intellectual effort to 
prevent punishing a person for acts that are a product of 
disease. The disease of mental illness, however, can be 
difficult to objectively measure. Its subjective nature has 
consistently undermined public support for the insanity 
defense. Cancer cannot be faked, but insanity can . . . or so 
the argument goes. 
Reporter Mac McClelland perhaps encapsulated the 
influence of public perception on the insanity defense best 
with this quote from her 2017 New York Times article, When 
“Not Guilty” Is a Life Sentence:  
Perhaps the most cleareyed view of the compromises inherent in 
[not guilty by reason of insanity] commitments comes from Paul 
Appelbaum, professor and director of the division of law, ethics and 
psychiatry at Columbia University. Appelbaum acknowledges that 
some [defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity] are 
“unnecessarily detained for a longer period than what seems to be 
warranted by their mental disorder and its impact on their 
likelihood of being violent in the future.” But, he says, such 
exaggerated concerns about public safety may be necessary to the 
survival of the insanity defense. “There are injustices that are 
imposed on individuals,” Appelbaum says. “But I also see at a 
30,000-foot level why the system works that way, and recognize 
perhaps the paradox that if it didn’t work that way, we might lose 
the insanity defense altogether, or at the very least have an even 
more restrictive system that we have to deal with.”305  
The defendant in the 1847 Freeman case discussed above 
was represented by future Governor of New York and 
Secretary of State William Seward.306 During his closing 
argument, Seward had this to say about the insanity defense:  
We labor under the further embarrassment that the plea of 
insanity is universally suspected. It is the last subterfuge of the 
guilty, and so is too often abused. But however obnoxious to 
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suspicion this defense is, there have been cases where it was true; 
and when true it is of all pleas the most perfect and complete 
defense that can be offered in any human tribunal.307 
Many members of the public indeed view the insanity 
defense as the last subterfuge of the guilty. The insanity 
defense, however, is used far less often than many people 
believe, and is even less often successful.308 
The public imagination is easily inflamed by the insanity 
defense. That is because the acts that lead to criminal 
charges are often horrific. It is an ongoing challenge for our 
criminal justice system to separate acts that are a 
consequence of disease from those that arise from criminal 
intent. The challenge can only be met by judging each case 
individually, on its own unique set of facts. 
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